A
Addvviissoorryy JJuurriissddiiccttiioonn ooff tthhee IIC
CJJ
T
Thhee W
WH
HO
OC
Caassee:: IIm
mpplliiccaattiioonnss ffoorr SSppeecciiaalliizzeedd A
Aggeenncciieess
Submitted by: Amit Kumar Meena
4 Year, National Law School of India University
Bangalore, India
th

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

2

'WHO' COMPETENCE TO REQUEST ADVISORY OPINIONS

2

A. ARTICLE 96, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

3

B. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WHO

3

C. ARTICLE 76 OF THE WHO CONSTITUTION

4

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF THE ICJ AND ADVISORY OPINIONS

5

THE WHO CASE AND THE DECISION OF THE ICJ

6

CRITIQUE OF THE ICJ'S DECISION

7

A. 'STATIC INTERPRETATION' OF THE WHO CONSTITUTION

7

B. THE RESTRICTED INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF WHO ACTIVITIES

8

IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

9

CONCLUSION/ABSTRACT

11

BIBLIOGRAPHY

13

Page 1 of 13

INTRODUCTION
On 8th of July, 1996 the International Court of Justice1 handed down long awaited
decisions2 in the requests from the World Health Organization3 and the United Nations
General Assembly4 for 'advisory opinions' on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons. In its 'Advisory Opinion' on the request from the General Assembly, the ICJ
ruled, by the narrowest of majorities, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 'would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict' subject
to one apparent exception.5 However, the ICJ declined to give the 'Advisory Opinion'
requested by the WHO Assembly.
The opinion of the ICJ refusing the request of the WHO Assembly has understandably
attracted less interest than the Court's 'Advisory Opinion' in reply to the request of the
General Assembly, as it is limited to the question of the competence of the WHO to
request an advisory opinion. Nevertheless, the ICJ's opinion in the WHO case raises a
number of important issues regarding the interpretation of the constitution of
international organizations and the role of specialized agencies within the UN system.
This paper mainly examines the 'Advisory Jurisdiction' of the ICJ, the competence of the
WHO to request for an 'Advisory Opinion', the ICJ's decision to reject the WHO's request
and the possible repercussions of the ICJ's decision.

'WHO' COMPETENCE TO REQUEST ADVISORY OPINIONS
The following question was put forth by the WHO to the International Court of Justice:
-

In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons
by a state in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under
international law including the WHO constitution?

It is imperative to examine the WHO's competency for any request to the ICJ in order to
specifically understand the 'legal position' in reference to the aforementioned WHO's
request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘ICJ’.
See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports,
1996.
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘WHO’.
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘UN General Assembly’.
5
International Law, The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Laurence Boisson De
Chazournes and Philippe Sands (Ed.), 1999 at 1.
2
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A. ARTICLE 96, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Article 96, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter states:
"Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any
time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities."

The wording of the paragraph has been viewed to give the specialized agencies a
"general" authorization to ask for advisory opinions from the court at any time, as long as
the request falls within the scope of the activities of the specialized agencies. In order to
clarify the "general" authorization conferred on the specialized agencies by the General
Assembly, a resolution was adopted authorizing the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) "to request advisory opinio6ns of the International Court of Justice on legal
questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Council."7
Agreements between the ECOSOC and the specialized agencies granted the WHO
authority to ask for advisory opinions from the ICJ.8 The WHO has previously used this
power only once, concerning the interpretation of the 1951 WHO-Egypt Treaty.9 In that
case, the WHO wanted to move its Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office from
Alexandria, Egypt, to Amman, Jordan, due to the Accords Egypt had signed with Israel
at Camp David. The ICJ advised that the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office could
be transferred regardless of the Accord, but the WHO had to give Egypt reasonable
notice of the transfer and negotiate in good faith to minimize Egypt's resulting damages.
In 1981, as a result of the advisory opinion, the WHO adopted a resolution and moved
its office.10

B. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WHO
Article X, Paragraph 2 of the 'Agreement between the United Nations and the

6

Strahan, Martin M., “Nuclear Weapons, The World Health Organization, And The International Court Of
Justice: Should An Advisory Opinion Bring Them Together?”, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law, 1995.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
The advisory opinion, requested by the WHO in 1980, was only the third advisory opinion ever requested
by a United Nations specialized agency and the first one requested by the WHO. See generally
Wintermeyer, Charles A., Jr., “ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt Treaty”, 10 DENV. J. INT'l L. &
POL'Y, 1980.
10
Wintermeyer, Charles A., Jr., “ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt Treaty”, 10 DENV. J. INT'l L.
& POL'Y, 1980.
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WHO',11 which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on November 15,
1947, and by the Health Assembly on July 10, 194812, addresses the relationship
between the United Nations and the WHO.
Article X, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement contains authorization from the General
Assembly allowing the WHO to request advisory opinions from the ICJ on "legal
questions arising within the scope of its competence other than questions
concerning mutual relationships of the Organization and the United Nations or
other specialized agencies."
Although Article X, paragraph 2 of the Agreement appears to be a restatement of Article
96, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, there is an important distinction. While
the UN Charter expressly allows specialized agencies to request advisory opinions
arising within the "scope of their activities", the Agreement limits requests for advisory
opinions from the WHO to questions arising within the "scope of its competence".
Though the distinction may to be seemed small but it is of much significance as "scope
of their activities" may be viewed as a much broader description than "scope of its
competence."13 Thus, while the United Nations Charter allows specialized agencies to
request advisory opinions regarding any pursuit in which the agency is active, the
Agreement limits the WHO's request to areas in which it is duly qualified14.

C. ARTICLE 76 OF THE WHO CONSTITUTION
The final authority that must be reviewed to determine the competence of the WHO is
Article 76 of the WHO Constitution. Article 76 of the WHO Constitution is a simple
restatement of the Agreement between the United Nations and the WHO governing the
WHO's ability to ask for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.15
'However, the Constitutional version of the ability to request an advisory opinion is based
on the wording of the Agreement not on the wording of the Charter'.16 Thus, requests for
advisory opinions are limited to legal questions arising within the "competence" of the
WHO.
11

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agreement’.
See Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, Nov. 12, 1948, U.N.W.H.O., 19 U.N.T.S. 193.
13
See The Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the word "Competent" as: "Duly qualified; answering all
requirements; having sufficient capacity, ability or authority.." and the word "Activity" as "An occupation
or pursuit in which [a] person is active."
14
Supra note 6.
15
Supra note 10.
12
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DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF THE ICJ AND ADVISORY OPINIONS
While the ability of the WHO to request an advisory opinion is unquestionable, it is not
absolute with respect to the kinds of questions it may pose.17 Furthermore, it must also
be noted that the ICJ, which heard its first dispute in 1947, retains the discretion to
decide whether it will give an advisory opinion.18
There are several factors that the ICJ considers while deciding to give an advisory
opinion. First, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which the ICJ will
refuse to give an advisory opinion. The relevant grounds for refusal are: "the 'political'
nature of the question posed, . . . the 'abstract' nature of the question, . . . [And]
the absence of consent on the part of a state immediately concerned."19
The ICJ is seldom asked for advisory opinions20 and has seldom refused to give an
advisory opinion. However, the Permanent International Court of Justice set the
precedent for refusing to give an advisory opinion. In the case of Eastern Carelia, the
PCIJ refused to give an advisory opinion due to "non membership in the League of one
of the disputants and that disputant's failure to agree to, or be represented in, the
proceedings of the Court."21

16

Supra note 10.
The WHO may ask the ICJ for advisory opinions "arising within the scope of its competence other than
questions concerning mutual relationships of the Organization and the United Nations or other specialized
agencies." See the Article X, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the World
Health Organization.
18
Pomerance, Michla, The Advisory Function Of The International Court In The League And U.N. Eras,
1973 at 281 cited in Liz Heffernan, “The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections On The Advisory
Procedure Of The International Court Of Justice”, Stetson Law Review, 1998.
19
Id.
20
Schwebel, Stephen M., “Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Without
Amending Its Statute”, 33 CATH. U. L. REV., 1984. Stephen M. Schwebel states that “It is a reflection of
the intensely political character of the Security Council and the General Assembly that they have resorted
to the Court under paragraph one of article 96 only fourteen times between 1946 and 1983 and that, for
their part, the numerous specialized agencies of the United Nations have had recourse to the Court only
three times in all. In contrast, the Council of the League of Nations has made requests to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which, in about half that period, resulted in twenty-seven advisory
opinions.”
21
See The Status of East Carelia (Fin. v. U.S.S.R.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 5, July 23 as cited in
Schwebel, Stephen M., “Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Without
Amending Its Statute”, 33 CATH. U. L. REV., 1984. In Eastern Carelia, the League of Nations Council
requested an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice as to whether the 1920
Peace Treaty between Finland and Russia, and an annexed Russian Declaration regarding the autonomy of
Eastern Carelia, placed Russia under an obligation to Finland to carry out the provisions contained therein.
Russia, then not a member of the League of Nations, refused to participate when the matter came before the
PCIJ. The Court, reasoning that no nation could be required without its consent to submit to a specific
settlement found it "impossible to give its opinion on a dispute of this kind."
17
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THE WHO CASE AND THE DECISION OF THE ICJ
As has been outlined earlier, in the past the ICJ had identified certain conditions which
must be satisfied in order to exercise its advisory jurisdiction upon a request submitted
by a specialized agency, namely, the agency had to be authorized to request opinions in
general; the question on which the opinion was to be based must be a legal one; and the
question must be one arising within the scope of the requesting agency's activities.
Applying these conditions to the WHO request, the ICJ found that while the first two
conditions had been met, the third had not been satisfied. The ICJ found that, as a
general matter, the WHO is empowered by its Constitution to request opinions of the
ICJ.22 In addition, the actual question posed by the WHO was deemed to be a legal one.
Nevertheless, the ICJ determined that the question did not come within the WHO's area
of competence.23 On this basis, it declined to render an advisory opinion.
The field of activity or the area of competence of an international organization is
determined principally by reference to its constituent instruments,24 in this case, the
WHO Constitution. While acknowledging the special characteristics of the constituent
instruments of international organizations, the ICJ noted that such instruments are
subject to the well-established rules of treaty interpretation as expressed in Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.25 Applying such rules, the ICJ
concluded that although the subject of nuclear weapons implicated the WHO mandate in
a general sense, the actual request fell outside the scope of its activities.26 The WHO is
authorized to deal with the effects hazardous activities have on health.27 However, the
WHO's request for an advisory opinion did not relate to the effects of the use of nuclear
weapons on health, it related to the legality of such use, merely taking into account
health and environmental effects.28 The ICJ concluded that, regardless of the effects of
the use of nuclear weapons, the WHO's competence to deal with those effects is not
dependent on the legality of the precipitating acts.29
The ICJ bolstered its conclusion by considering the WHO's role in the UN family. It
22

See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request of the World Health
Organization), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996. (See Appendix).
23
Id.
24
Supra note 6.
25
Supra note 22.
26
Supra note 22.
27
Supra note 22.
28
Supra note 22.
29
Supra note 22.
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recalled the principle of 'speciality' to underscore the fact that, as a specialized agency,
the WHO is an organization of a particular kind, invested with sectoral power within the
UN system. Restricted to the sphere of public health, the WHO's responsibilities do not
extend to questions concerning the use of force and the regulation of armaments and
disarmament which lie within the competence of the UN.30

CRITIQUE OF THE ICJ'S DECISION
The decision of the ICJ in the WHO case, which has been perceived to be of a broader
interest, has generated a lot of debate in the academic circles. While some international
scholars have considered the Court's decision to be a positive result31 others have
considered the same to be backward step in the development of international law in
relation to specialized agencies.32 The Court's decision has been mainly criticized on
two grounds, namely the 'static interpretation' given to the WHO Constitution and
restricted interpretation given to the scope of the WHO activities.

A. 'STATIC INTERPRETATION' OF THE WHO CONSTITUTION
In determining whether the WHO had the competence to ask for an advisory opinion, the
ICJ had considered whether the issue was within the scope of WHO activities and
referred to a number of provisions of the WHO Constitution relating to the objectives and
functions of the Organizations, stating:
“None of these subparagraphs expressly refers to the legality of any activity
hazardous to health, and none of the functions of the WHO is dependant upon the
legality of the situation upon which it must act.”

33

However, as has been pointed out by some scholars, many of the activities, which the
WHO has pursued over the years, are not expressly mentioned in the list of WHO
constitutional functions.34

30

Supra note 22.
See Heffernan, Liz, “The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections On The Advisory Procedure Of The
International Court Of Justice”, Stetson Law Review, 1998.
32
See Virginia Leary, “The WHO Case: Implications for Specialized Agencies”, International Law, The
International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Philippe Sands
(Ed.), 1999 at 112.
33
Supra note 22.
31
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As Osieke has pointed out in commenting on the ILO Constitution:
“But no Constitution can foresee and make express provisions for all the future
developments and vicissitudes in any international organization and, so, these
bodies are normally left some flexibility and freedom to take related measures
which they consider essential for the effective fulfillment of their Objects and
Purposes… within the general framework of their constitutions, international
organizations are permitted, and this is recognized in international law, to take
measures which are not expressly provided for in the constitution, but which they
consider essential or necessary for the effective discharge of their mandates.”

35

In fact, many activities are currently being undertaken by the WHO which are not listed
in the functions prescribed in Article 2 of the Constitution.36 In fact, the Health Assembly
has not limited its interpretation of the WHO constitution to the listed functions in Article
2, but has related its activities to the objectives of the Organization.

B. THE RESTRICTED INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF WHO ACTIVITIES
While delivering its judgment in the 'WHO case' ICJ had stated that the WHO
competence is 'necessarily restricted to the sphere of public health' and had found that
the WHO had only limited sectoral powers.
However, the field of 'health' is scarcely a narrow one, and protecting and promoting
health requires the collaboration of many UN organizations, as evidenced by WHO
agreements with numerous other international organizations.37 In fact, coherence and
coordination are the main jurisdictional concerns within the UN system and the WHO
work in the health field cannot be isolated from the concerns of many other UN branches
and organizations.38
Thus, it has been stated that the 'scope' of the activities of the WHO is not a narrow one,
but in fact, touches on numerous aspects not always considered as part of the health
agenda.
34

Supra note 32.
E. Osieke, Constituional Law and Practice in the International Labour Organization, 1985 at 9.
36
The Health Assembly, for example, adopted in 1981, with only one negative vote, an International Code
of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, in the form of a recommendation, and urged all member states to
translate into national legislation or other suitable measures.
37
In 1995 Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation
Sources were drafted through the collaboration of seven international organizations (ILO, FAO, WHO,
PAHO, IAEA, NEA of OECD and ICAO).
38
Virginia Leary, “The WHO Case: Implications for Specialized Agencies”, International Law, The
International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Philippe Sands
(Ed.), 1999 at 114.
35
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
The Court's approach as regards the request of the WHO is concerned seems to imply
that the activities of international organizations, and the WHO in particular, can be neatly
categorized as concerning separate and distinct fields.39 In fact, the Court has stated
that the WHO competence is 'necessarily restricted to the sphere of public health'.
While it is recognized that specialized agencies and branches of the UN system have
mandates in particular fields to which they give special attention, and that they should
not arbitrarily interpret those mandates, it has become increasingly evident that most of
the mandates overlap with other agencies or branches and that the clear lines of
demarcation are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Inter-agency agreements
and joint projects abound, resulting from the realization that major international problems
have multiple social, political and technical implications and cannot be resolved by one
specialized agency or organ alone.40
In the present day world there are many examples of overlapping jurisdiction. For
example, intellectual property issues and environmental issues are now on the agenda
of the World Trade Organization, although they are the primary responsibility of WIPO
and UNEP. Also, the ILO is debating issues of links between trade and labor rights,
although trade is the domain of the WTO.
In fact, in his dissent, Judge Weeramantry cites many examples and concludes:
“The family of United Nations organizations was not set up in a fretwork
pattern of neatly dovetailing components, each with a precisely carved
outline of its own. These organizations deal with human activities and
human interrelationships, and it is of their very nature that they should
have over lapping areas of concern. Their broad contours are of course
defined, but different aspects of the self same question may well fall within
the ambit of two or more organizations.” 41
More importantly for the WHO, it has obtained from an authoritative source a restrictive
and static interpretation of its Constitution. Nevertheless, “it is to be expected that the
World Health Assembly, exercising its prerogative of interpreting the WHO constitution in
the first instance, will continue to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the
39

Ibid at 124.
See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons
in Armed Conflict (Request of the World Health Organization), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996.

40
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objective of the Organization: 'the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health' and will not hesitate to adopt appropriate methods to do so, whether or
not they are specifically listed as 'functions' in the Constitution”.42
Lastly, the effect of the ICJ's decision may be increased caution in the future on the part
of specialized agencies which are considering requesting advisory opinions concerning
the interpretation of their constitutions. In fact, it has been stated that the Court's
restrictive interpretation of the WHO constitution as well as its reference to the 1927
PCIJ opinion on European Commission on the Danube,43 emphasizing a narrow
application of the principle of specialty are backward steps in the development of the law
of international organizations - and hence, a matter of concern to all organs and
branches of the UN system and to the international legal scholars.44

41

Id.
Supra note 38 at 126-127.
43
Jurisdiction of the European Commission on the Danube, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B, No. 14, at
64.
44
Supra note 38 at 126-127.
42
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CONCLUSION/ABSTRACT
The ICJ proceedings in the case concerning 'legality of the use by a state of nuclear
weapons in armed conflict' are indicative of the sharp differences of view held by
different states as to the proper role and function of international organizations.
On the one hand there were some states, which proposed the view that organizations
such as the WHO are established solely to fulfill those tasks which have been expressly
spelled out in their constituent instruments, subject to construction of any implied powers
which are absolutely necessary for achieving those objectives. In this context, and
particularly with respect to the organizations of the United Nations system, reference
was largely made to the origins of their creation and to 'functionalist theory'. This
approach stressed the need for an appropriate division of responsibilities between the
United Nations organization, on the one hand, and the UN specialized agencies, on the
other. It would leave powers of general scope to former and specialized sectoral powers
to the latter. This view was supplemented by the belief that questions with strong political
flavor should not be dealt with by the specialized agencies at all.
The alternative view did not deny the need for an appropriate division of responsibilities
among the various international organizations. Rather, it suggested that today's issues
are increasingly complex and will often cut across the institutional competencies
envisaged in the 1940s and 1950s. According to this approach, international
organizations can use different and often more wide-ranging tools and techniques to
achieve their general objectives. This implies an expanded view of their roles and
activities.
The two approaches can be compared. The first takes a 'restrictive approach' to
recourse to international law as an instrument of policy development. Some states
considered that Article 2 of the WHO Constitution does not allow resort to the
development of international law as a way to achieve WHO objectives.45 The
International Court endorsed this view. The second approach indicates a more
'purposive function' when the organization becomes an actor in its own right,
determining for itself the scope of its competence and the extent to which it may resort to
tools, which have not been granted to it in express terms at its inception.
In the case in question, in application of the principle of 'specialty', the Court declined to

45

Supra note 38 at 122.
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accede to the WHO request. Some of the international jurists consider this conclusion to
be backward step in the development of the law of international organizations, while
others consider that the Court acted correctly.
Perhaps the ICJ's rebuff to the WHO can be best understood in the context of the
Court's decision to accede to the request from the General Assembly. Since the General
Assembly had submitted a similar request, the ICJ could reject the WHO request without
losing an opportunity to address the substantive issue of the legality of nuclear weapons.
In effect, this two-track request enabled the ICJ to be legally exact and politically
pragmatic at the same time.
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